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BALANCING ACT: WILL THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION ALLOW EUROPEAN 
FOOTBALL* TO REESTABLISH THE 
COMPETITIVE BALANCE THAT IT HELPED 
DESTROY? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some people think that [European] football is a matter of life 
and death. I don’t take that attitude. I can assure them it is much 
more serious than that.1  
his sentiment reflects the special place that European football 
holds for so many. The sport, which was first organized by Lon-
don schools in 1863, has united Europe for nearly 150 years.2 Today, 
fifty-two European nations have national European football associations, 
most of which organize professional leagues within their respective na-
tion.3
T 
Aside from the sport’s social significance, European football has be-
come a prominent part of Europe’s entertainment industry. The commer-
cialization of European football is often traced to the 1980s when televi-
sion recognized European football as valuable content, and advertising 
revenue began to flow into the sport.4 In 2006, Deloitte & Touche esti-
mated that across Europe, professional football generated £7.8 billion in 
total revenue.5 It seems clear, however, that the sport was not prepared 
for such economic growth. With the commercialization of European 
football came rising operating costs, most noticeably in the form of 
                                                                                                             
 *  For purposes of this Note, the term “European football” refers to the sport known 
as soccer in the United States. The term is used here to refer specifically to the profes-
sional game within Europe. 
 1. This famous quote was first uttered by Bill Shankly, former manager of the Eng-
lish club Liverpool FC. Jens Pelle van den Brink, EC Competition Law and the Regula-
tion of European Football, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 105, 105 (2000). 
 2. See Wilfried Gerhardt, The Colourful History of a Fascinating Game (2000), 
http://www.fifa.com/fifa/history_E.html. 
 3. See UEFA, Associations, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/Match 
Associations/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 4. See UEFA, VISION EUROPE 19 (2005), http://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/374875. 
pdf. “Vision Europe” is a report from UEFA, European football’s governing body, outlin-
ing the strategy for governing the sport over the next decade. See id. at 4. 
 5. Press Release, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Premiership Wages Drop for First Time 
Ever (June 1, 2006), http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/0,1014,sid%253D% 
2526cid%253D120056,00.html. In June of 2006, £7.5 billion equaled just over $14.5 
billion. Press Release, U.S. Federal Reserve, Historical Rates for United Kingdom (Jan. 
19, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/hist/dat00_uk.htm. 
710 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:2 
                                                                                                            
player salaries. These higher stakes have put small-market clubs6 out of 
business, while many other clubs struggle to turn a profit.7 The few clubs 
that are financially stable generally operate in large markets in Europe. 
As the financial gap between large and small-market clubs grows, the 
sport itself has begun to suffer. Today, large-market clubs dominate 
European football in leagues across all of Europe, leaving the majority of 
clubs with no hope of remaining competitive. This lack of competitive 
balance in European football is the focus of this Note. 
Within the professional sporting world it is generally accepted that 
there must be a competitive balance among teams in order to preserve the 
integrity of sporting competition, the interest of fans, and in turn, com-
mercial success. In any sport, if a few elite teams are able to collect all of 
the best players so that other teams cannot provide reasonable competi-
tion on the field, results will become predictable, and spectators, spon-
sors, advertisers, and broadcasters will all lose interest.8 Thus, when the 
unrestricted market for players fosters a competitive imbalance among 
teams, it is within the interest of sporting associations, leagues, and or-
ganizations to enforce restrictions so as to restore a competitive balance.9
To some extent, European law has enhanced European football’s grow-
ing lack of parity. More than a century ago the transfer system was cre-
ated as a means to instill competitive balance among clubs in European 
football.10 This system remained largely in place until the 1995 landmark 
case Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association ASBL v. 
Jean-Marc Bosman, where the European Court of Justice (ECJ)11 held 
 
 6. Throughout this Note, the term “club” shall be used to refer to European football 
teams.  
 7. See Jack Ewing et al., Can Football Be Saved?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, July 19, 2004, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_29/b3892022.htm. 
 8. Adam Lewis et al., Player Transfers, in SPORT: LAW AND PRACTICE, 840, 846 
(Adam Lewis & Jonathan Taylor eds., 2003). 
 9. Id. 
 10. James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle over European Football’s Transfer Sys-
tem, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 668 (2002); see also infra Part II.B. 
 11. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is an institution of the European Commu-
nity. The ECJ, comprised of judges from each European Community member state, func-
tions to ensure that Community law is interpreted and enforced uniformly by all member 
states. The ECJ has the power to settle disputes between Community member states, 
Community institutions, businesses, and individuals, as well as to make preliminary rul-
ings on interpretation of European Community law at the request of national courts. The 
ECJ also includes Advocate Generals who provide detailed recommendations or “advi-
sory opinions” to the court before it rules on novel issues of law. See Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (consolidated text), arts. 220–45, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [herein-
after EC Treaty]. 
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that the transfer system violated Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome.12 Sub-
sequently, the European Commission (EC)13 negotiated rule changes 
bringing the transfer system in line with the Bosman decision and with 
European competition law.14 Unfortunately, these changes seem to have 
undermined the transfer system’s effectiveness. The resulting lack of 
parity among European football clubs has predictably led to a small 
group of elite clubs that dominate competition perennially.15 In turn, 
leagues in countries such as England and Italy are experiencing large 
drops in attendance.16 The current poor state of European football has 
prompted high-ranking people within the sport to call for limits on player 
salaries as a means of reestablishing competitive balance among clubs.17 
However, questions remain as to whether a salary cap or other restrictive 
measures would be a violation of European competition law. Will the EC 
allow European football to reestablish the competitive balance that it 
helped destroy? 
The purpose of this Note is to evaluate whether or not restricting the 
amount of money European football clubs can spend on player salaries in 
an effort to revitalize competitive balance would violate European com-
petition law. Part II of the Note traces how the ECJ and EC have contrib-
uted to the sport’s lack of competitive balance. Part III looks at salary 
caps and other policies meant to institute balance. Part IV reviews Euro-
pean competition law and governance of sport in Europe. Part V analyzes 
whether salary restrictions would violate European competition law, and 
whether salary restrictions could be exempt from EC regulation. Part VI 
is a conclusion. 
 
 12. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association ASBL 
v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921. See infra Part II.C. 
 13. The European Commission (EC) is the executive arm of the European Commu-
nity. As such, it proposes legislation to parliament, manages and implements Community 
policies and budgets, and enforces European Community law. See EC Treaty, supra note 
11, arts. 211–19. For purposes of this note, it is significant that the EC generally regulates 
and enforces EC competition law. See Irving, supra note 10, at 672. 
 14. See Irving, supra note 10, at 688–723; see also infra Part II.D. 
 15. Stratis Camatsos, European Sports, the Transfer System and Competition Law: 
Will They Ever Find a Competitive Balance?, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 155, 178 (2005); see 
also infra Part II.E.  
 16. See Premier League Probes Crowd Slump, BBC SPORT (U.K.), Sept. 20, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/eng_prem/4264936.stm; Juventus Deserve Big-
ger Crowds Says Moggi, REUTERS (Rome), Oct. 4, 2005, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/ 
news/story?id=344884&cc=5901. See also infra Part II.E. 
 17. See Nick Harris, Whelan Calls for a Top Flight Salary Cap, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), 
Sept. 22, 2005, available at http://sport.independent.co.uk/football/news/ 
article314199.ece; see also infra Part III. 
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II. THE PROBLEM: A LACK OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN EUROPEAN 
FOOTBALL 
A. The Structure of European Football 
In order to understand European football and its relationship with the 
law, a basic understanding of the structure of the sport would be helpful 
given that it differs from the American professional sports model. At the 
top of the hierarchy is the Federation Internationale de Football Associa-
tion (FIFA) which governs football at the world level.18 FIFA is divided 
into confederations which govern each continent.19 The European con-
federation is the Union des Associations Europeennes de Football 
(UEFA).20 UEFA is comprised of the national associations of each coun-
try in Europe.21 National associations must comply with UEFA regula-
tions and decisions, and UEFA in turn, is subject to FIFA regulations.22 
National associations govern virtually all aspects of football within their 
respective countries, including enforcement of FIFA and UEFA regula-
tions, organization of leagues, the relationship between leagues and 
clubs, and the relationship between clubs and players.23
Professional European football leagues are organized by nation and are 
generally structured quite differently from American leagues. The Euro-
pean approach features a divisional hierarchy within each league, and a 
system of promotion and relegation.24 First division clubs play at a 
higher level than second division clubs, which play at a higher level than 
third division clubs, and so on.25 In all divisions, at the end of the season, 
a limited number of the worst performing clubs (usually between one to 
four clubs) are relegated to the immediately lower division, while the 
 
 18. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5044. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.; see, e.g., The Football Association—The Organisation, http://www.thefa.com/ 
TheFA/TheOrganisation (outlining the role of the English national association, the FA). 
 24. See Stefan Szymanski & Tommaso M. Valletti, Promotion and Relegation in 
Sporting Contests, at 2 n.8 (2003), available at www.nhh.no/sam/stabssem/2003/ 
szymanski.pdf. 
 25. See id. Taking England as our example, the top division in England is called the 
“Premier League” (or “Premiership”), which features the top twenty clubs in England. 
Below the Premier League is the English second division known as “Championship” 
which consists of the next best twenty-four clubs. Below Championship is “League One,” 
and below that is “League Two”—both of which also feature twenty-four clubs. See BBC 
Sport—Football, http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/default.stm (last visited Jan. 20, 
2007). 
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same number of top performing clubs in each division are promoted to 
the immediately higher division.26
Aside from professional leagues, UEFA organizes pan-European com-
petitions that bring together the top clubs from each national league, in-
cluding the UEFA Champions League—the winner of which is consid-
ered the champion of Europe.27 These competitions generally follow a 
format closer to the American model where clubs are split into groups 
and play only those clubs within their group.28 At the end of the group 
stage, the winner and runner-up of each group advance to a series of 
knock-out rounds, similar to playoffs in American sports, where the win-
ner advances and the loser is eliminated.29 The last club remaining is the 
winner of the competition. 
B. The Transfer System 
The importance of comparatively level teams for the success of sport-
ing leagues was recognized as far back as the late nineteenth century 
when the transfer system was first created in England.30 The purpose of 
the system was to control player movement so that wealthier clubs could 
not buy the best players away from smaller clubs without compensa-
tion.31 Over time, the transfer system was adopted by leagues across all 
of Europe.32 Under the rules of the transfer system, at the end of a sea-
son, each club produced a list of players to be retained for the next sea-
son (retention list) and a list of players who were available for transfer to 
another club (transfer list).33 Players that were not included on the trans-
fer list had no right to demand a transfer.34 Players that were on the 
transfer list could be purchased by another club for a “transfer fee” set by 
 
 26. See Szymanski & Valletti, supra note 24. Returning to the English system as our 
example, at the end of the season, the three worst performing clubs in the Premier League 
are relegated to Championship, and the top three clubs in Championship are promoted to 
the Premier League. See Premiership Standings—2005/06, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/ 
tables?league=eng.1&cc=5901. Promotion and relegation also occur between Champion-
ship and League One, and between League One and League Two. 
 27. See UEFA—Champions League Format, http://www.uefa.com/competitions/ucl/ 
Format/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
 28. See, e.g., id. 
 29. See, e.g., id. 
 30. See Irving, supra note 10, at 668. 
 31. Id. at 669. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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the selling club.35 Although the transfer system has been modified over 
time, this fundamental structure has remained unchanged.36
It is significant that players whose contracts had expired were not ex-
empt from the transfer system. Transfer rules were set out by both FIFA 
and UEFA, and incorporated into the rules of national associations which 
had some discretion as to how they were enforced.37 As a result, club 
control over players who were no longer under contract varied from 
country to country within Europe.38 Ultimately, however, UEFA and 
FIFA rules required that a transfer fee be paid to the former club at some 
point, in order to sign a player whose contract had expired.39 By allowing 
clubs to receive transfer fees for players, whether under contract or not, 
the transfer system enabled small-market clubs to either retain their top 
players or be compensated for transferring them, and thus compete with 
big market clubs.40 In short, the transfer system helped impose competi-
tive balance throughout European football. 
C. The Bosman Decision 
In December of 1995, Jean-Marc Bosman, a little-known football 
player from Belgium, challenged the legality of the transfer system. The 
result was a decision from the ECJ that would fundamentally change the 
transfer system and the governance of sport in Europe. 
Jean-Marc Bosman played for FC Liege, a Belgian first division club, 
and his contract was set to expire in June of 1990.41 On April 21, 1990, 
FC Liege offered Bosman a new contract that reduced his salary from 
120,000 Belgian francs (BFR) per month to BFR 30,000 per month.42 
Bosman rejected the offer and was placed on a transfer list with a trans-
fer fee of more than BFR 11 million. This fee was calculated in accor-
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Camatsos, supra note 15, at 157; see also Irving, supra note 10 (outlining in detail 
the development of the transfer system from its inception through Bosman). 
 37. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5046. 
 38. Compare Irving, supra note 10, at 672 (noting that by 1978 England’s transfer 
system allowed a player whose contract had expired to sign with a club of the player’s 
choice even if his new club and his former club could not agree on a transfer fee, in 
which case transfer tribunals would determine the fee), with Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-
5047 (noting that the Belgian transfer system, like most European systems, allowed clubs 
to set a transfer fee for a player whose contract had expired, and such a player could not 
sign with a new club until the new club agreed to pay the transfer fee). 
 39. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5047. 
 40. Jesse Gary, The Demise of Sport? The Effect of Judicially Mandated Free Agency 
on European Football and American Baseball, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 293, 298 (2005). 
 41. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5050. 
 42. Id. 
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dance with the transfer rules as set out by the Union Royale Belge des 
Societes de Football Association ASBL (URBSFA), Belgium’s national 
association.43 By June 1, no clubs had showed interest in Bosman given 
his high transfer fee, so according to URBSFA rules, a “free” transfer 
period began during which a club could negotiate a mutually agreeable 
transfer fee with FC Liege.44 Once the free transfer period began, Bos-
man arranged a contract with US Dunkerque, a second division French 
club, at BFR 100,000 per month, plus a BFR 900,000 signing bonus.45 
US Dunkerque and FC Liege then agreed on a one-year transfer of Bos-
man for BFR 1,200,000, with an option to purchase a full transfer after 
one year.46 However, FC Liege, concerned about US Dunkerque’s sol-
vency, withheld required paperwork and the transfer never took effect.47 
On July 31, FC Liege suspended Bosman for the entire 1990–1991 sea-
son, as was its right under URBSFA transfer rules.48
Ultimately, after four years of lawsuits, the Belgian national courts re-
ferred two questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.49 One of the 
questions focused on whether Articles 48,50 85, and 8651 of the Treaty of 
Rome prohibited “a football club from requiring and receiving payment 
of a sum of money upon the engagement of one of its players who has 
come to the end of his contract by a new employing club.”52 Many 
within Europe felt that the very survival of football was at stake.53
 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at I-5046, I-5050. 
 45. Id. at I-5050–I-5051. 
 46. Id. at I-5051. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at I-5056. 
 50. Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community) is now embodied in Article 39 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community. Article 39 guarantees freedom of movement for workers within the Euro-
pean Union. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 39. 
 51. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community) are now embodied in Articles 81 and 82 (respectively) of the EC 
Treaty. For the text of Article 81 see infra note 126. For the text of Article 82 see infra 
note 118. 
 52. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5056. The other question concerned whether or not 
foreign players could be restricted from European Community clubs and competitions. 
See id. This question is, however, outside the scope of this Note. See Lindsey Valaine 
Briggs, UEFA v. The European Community: Attempts of the Governing Body of Euro-
pean Soccer to Circumvent EU Freedom of Movement and Antidiscrimination Labor 
Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 439 (2005), for a discussion of this issue before, during, and after 
the Bosman decision. 
 53. See Irving, supra note 10, at 681 (detailing the sentiment of the football world in 
anticipation of the ECJ’s decision). 
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After determining that the transfer system constituted an obstacle to the 
freedom of movement of workers, the ECJ held that  
Article 48 of the Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by 
sporting associations, under which a professional footballer who is a 
national of one Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract 
with a club, be employed by a club of another Member State unless the 
latter club has paid to the former club a transfer, training or develop-
ment fee.54
In reaching its conclusion, the ECJ accepted the importance of “main-
taining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equal-
ity and uncertainty as to results. . . .”55 However, the ECJ found that the 
transfer system did not adequately maintain a competitive balance be-
tween clubs because it did not prevent the richest clubs from acquiring 
the best players.56 Furthermore, the ECJ held that there were alternative 
means of imposing a competitive balance that did not impede freedom of 
movement of workers, including instituting a salary cap and/or revenue-
sharing policies.57 Ironically, after expressing support for a salary cap, 
the ECJ declined to apply competition law under Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty of Rome, since the transfer system was already found to be in 
violation of Article 48.58
D. European Commission Rule Changes 
The European football world, though not happy with the ruling in 
Bosman, took comfort in the fact that the ECJ’s decision invalidated the 
transfer system only as it applied to players whose contracts had ex-
pired.59 Almost ninety percent of transfer revenue came from transfers of 
players who were still under contract, and FIFA and UEFA aimed at 
keeping what remained of the transfer system intact.60 However, the 
Bosman decision, as highly public as it was, put the football world under 
 
 54. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5073. 
 55. Id. at I-5071. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at I-5072. Note that the ECJ here is referencing the advisory opinion of Advo-
cate General Lenz. Recall that as part of the ECJ’s structure, Advocate Generals issue 
advisory opinions before the ECJ rules on a novel issue. See EC Treaty, supra note 11. In 
his opinion on the Bosman case, Advocate General Lenz set forth that the possibility of a 
salary cap as a means of preserving competitive balance without restricting freedom of 
movement of workers meant that the transfer system was in violation of the Article 48 of 
the Treaty of Rome. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5017. 
 58. Id. at I-5078. 
 59. Irving, supra note 10, at 688. 
 60. Id. at 689. 
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a microscope, and the EC, which had not generally involved itself in the 
sports industry prior to Bosman, was now suspicious of the entire transfer 
system.61 The EC was beginning to question whether transfer fees might 
violate both Article 48 free movement of workers62 and European com-
petition law.63 In April of 1998, after the much publicized and high-
priced transfer of Brazilian striker Ronaldo from FC Barcelona to Inter 
Milan, the EC warned FIFA that it would face official action if it did not 
amend its transfer rules.64 Lengthy, complex, and trying negotiations 
involving the EC, FIFA, UEFA, and the players’ union (FIFPro) en-
sued.65 Finally, in 2001, six years after the ECJ decided Bosman, FIFA 
adopted a new transfer system.66 A brief summary of the more signifi-
cant rule changes follows. 
One key rule provides that transfers can only take place during two 
limited periods of the year (transfer windows), one during the summer, 
and the other mid-season.67 Furthermore, a player can only be transferred 
once in a single season.68
In an effort to protect smaller clubs which usually develop younger 
players, new rules require purchasing clubs to compensate the selling 
club for the training of a player under the age of twenty-three.69 The 
amount of the compensation fee is to be calculated according to a codi-
fied formula.70 However, no compensation will be paid for transfers of 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. EU Warning to FIFA on Rules of Transfer, STATESMAN (India), Apr. 3, 1998. 
 64. Id. The entire football world paid close attention to the transfer of Ronaldo who, 
at barely 20 years old, was considered the best player in the world. In 1997, Ronaldo Luis 
Nazario de Lima, or “Ronaldo” as he is known internationally, became the first player to 
win back-to-back FIFA World Player of the Year awards. See A Night of Records and 
Premieres, FIFA.COM (1997), http://www.fifa.com/events/playergala/index_E_1997 
.html; Ronaldo, the 20th Century Footballer, FIFA.COM (1996), http://www.fifa.com/ 
events/playergala/index_E_1996.html. Considered by many to be the best Brazilian 
scorer since Pelé, Ronaldo went on to win the award again in 2002. See Ronaldo, Hamm 
Scoop Top Player Awards, FIFA.COM (2002), http://www.fifa.com/events/playergala/ 
MR_A/48852_E.html. 
 65. See Irving, supra note 10, at 688–722 (tracing, in depth, the negotiations from 
Bosman through to the 2001 agreement). 
 66. Id. at 716–17; FIFA, Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, July 5, 
2001, available at http://www.fifa.com/fifa/handbook/regulations/player_transfer/2003/ 
Status_Transfer_EN.pdf. 
 67. Id. at ch. 3, art. 5(2). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at ch. 7, art. 15. 
 70. Id. at ch. 7, art. 16. 
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players over the age of twenty-three.71 To further protect smaller devel-
opmental clubs, when a player is transferred mid-contract, five percent of 
the compensation paid to the selling club will be distributed among all 
clubs that trained the player between the ages of twelve and twenty-
three.72
Additionally, a number of rules address contract stability.73 The most 
significant of these rules allows players under twenty-eight years old to 
breach a contract unilaterally after the first three years, while players 
over twenty-eight years old can unilaterally breach after the first two 
years.74
E. The Lack of Competitive Balance in European Football 
Though the ECJ and the EC sought to protect a competitive balance 
among football clubs, the Bosman decision and the subsequent transfer 
system rule changes have only widened the gap between large and small-
market clubs.75 The Bosman decision liberalized player movement and 
shifted power from clubs to players.76 This, in turn, has triggered a dra-
matic increase in player salaries.77 Adding to the problem is the new rule 
allowing players unilaterally to breach their contracts, which forces clubs 
to pay top players astronomical salaries to prevent them from changing 
sides.78 As a result, top players pool together on big-market clubs.79
The rule creating transfer windows has also come under heavy scru-
tiny. Ironically, transfer windows both restrict freedom of movement and 
restrain competition, and thus seem to conflict with the Bosman decision 
and European competition law.80 Furthermore, transfer windows allow 
big-market clubs to hold onto their money so that they can buy all of the 
top players available when the windows are open, rather than allowing 
the market to dictate when and where players’ services are most val-
ued.81 It is therefore more likely that small-market clubs will be pushed 
out of the market for top players when the windows are open. 
 
 71. Id. at ch. 7, art. 20. 
 72. Id. at ch. 9, art. 25. 
 73. See id. at ch. 8. 
 74. See id. at ch. 8, art. 21(1)(a) & (1)(b). 
 75. See Camatsos, supra note 15, at 178. 
 76. Id. at 173. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 173–74. 
 79. See id. at 174–75. 
 80. Id. at 170. 
 81. Id. 
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The rule prohibiting transfer fees for players over the age of twenty-
three also effectively diminishes competitive equality. Big-market clubs 
can choose to exclusively pursue players twenty-four or older, and as a 
result never have to compensate small-market clubs for training.82
As a result of Bosman and the EC-mandated rule changes, a select few 
clubs have dominated their respective leagues in recent years. In Eng-
land’s Premier League, four clubs—Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, and 
Manchester United—have finished in the top five spots the last four sea-
sons. In two of those four seasons they were the top four clubs, and in the 
current 2006–2007 season, they once again occupy the top four spots.83 
Similarly, in Italy’s Serie A, three clubs—Juventus, Inter Milan, and AC 
Milan—have finished in the top four spots in each of the past four sea-
sons—finishing in the top three in three of those four seasons.84 In Ger-
many, Bayern Munich has won the championship three out of the last 
four years, finishing second in 2003–2004.85 In France, Lyon has been 
champion for four straight seasons, and is currently the leader in the 
2006–2007 season.86 Finally, in Holland, PSV Eindhoven has been 
 
 82. Id. at 171. It should be noted that the 2001 rule changes do not apply to amicable 
transfers. Thus, when the player, and both the selling and purchasing club agree on a 
transfer fee, large sums will continue to change hands regardless of a player’s age. See 
Irving, supra note 10, at 724. 
 83. See ESPN SoccerNet—Premiership Standings—2006/07, http://soccernet.espn. 
go.com/tables?league=eng.1&season=2006&column=none&order=false&cc=5901, (for 
2005/06 standings follow “2005/06” hyperlink; for 2004/05 standings follow “2004/05” 
hyperlink; for 2003/04 standings follow “2003/04” hyperlink; for 2002/03 standings fol-
low “2002/2003” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
 84. In the final standings from the 2005/06 Serie A season, Juventus and AC Milan 
do not appear in the top two spots (though they finished with the two best records) due to 
penalties the league assessed for their involvement in a match-fixing scandal. The extent 
to which their respective records were due to their underhanded arrangement rather than 
their play on the field will never be known. See ESPN SoccerNet—Italian Serie A Stand-
ings—2005/06, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/tables?league=ita.1&season=2005&column 
=none&order=false&cc=5901, (for 2004/05 standings follow “2004/05” hyperlink; for 
2003/04 standings follow “2003/04” hyperlink; for 2002/03 standings follow 
“2002/2003” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
 85. See ESPN SoccerNet—German Bundesliga Standings—2005/06, http://soccernet. 
espn.go.com/tables?league=ger.1&season=2005&column=none&order=false&cc=5901, 
(for 2004/05 standings follow “2004/05” hyperlink; 2003/04 standings follow “2003/04” 
hyperlink; for 2002/03 standings follow “2002/2003” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 
2007). 
 86. See ESPN SoccerNet—French Ligue 1 Standings—2006/07, http://soccernet. 
espn.go.com/tables?league=fra.1&season=2006&column=none&order=false&cc=5901, 
(for 2005/06 standings follow “2005/06” hyperlink; for 2004/05 standings follow 
“2004/05” hyperlink; 2003/04 standings follow “2003/04” hyperlink; for 2002/03 stand-
ings follow “2002/2003” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
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champion three of the last four seasons, finishing second in 2003–2004, 
and is in first place in 2006–2007.87
Additionally, in the last few years, clubs have challenged or set records 
for unprecedented winning, underscoring how dominant the elite clubs 
currently are. In Italy, Juventus set a record by starting the 2005–2006 
season with nine consecutive wins.88 In the 2003–2004 season, Arsenal 
did not lose a single game in the entire thirty-eight-game English season, 
finishing with twenty-six wins and twelve draws.89 Finally, Chelsea 
started the 2005–2006 season with nine consecutive victories in England, 
and went unbeaten in fourty straight league games dating back to the 
previous season.90
Such complete lack of parity has clearly had a negative effect on the 
sport. A recent Italian match between giants Juventus and Inter Milan 
drew a crowd of less than half the capacity of Juventus’ home stadium in 
Turin.91 This has caused the president of Italy’s national association to 
call for a reduction in ticket prices.92 England’s Premier League is facing 
similar problems, and has drawn up a working group to deal with dwin-
dling crowds.93 A member of the working group has pointed to “predict-
able results” as a possible cause for the attendance drop.94 So extreme is 
the lack of balance in England that seven matches into the 2005–2006 
season an Irish betting agency had already declared Chelsea the winner 
of the league with thirty-one matches left to play, and began paying out 
on single bets made on the defending champions.95 Clearly something 
must be done to impose balance among clubs and restore uncertainty as 
to results—something to make football matches meaningful again. But 
what? 
 
 87. See ESPN SoccerNet—Dutch Eredivisie Standings—2006/07, http://soccernet. 
espn.go.com/tables?league=ned.1&season=2006&column=none&order=false&cc=5901, 
(for 2005/2006 standings follow “2005/2006” hyperlink; for 2004/05 standings follow 
“2004/05” hyperlink; 2003/04 standings follow “2003/04” hyperlink; for 2002/03 stand-
ings follow “2002/2003” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
 88. Serie A: Juventus Set New Record with Victory, REUTERS (Rome), Oct. 26, 2005, 
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=347197&cc=5901. 
 89. See Premiership Standings—2003/04, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/tables?league 
=ENG.1&season=2003&column=none&order=false&cc=5901. 
 90. See Proud Mourinho “Not Afraid of the Future”, Nov. 6, 2005, http://soccernet. 
espn.go.com/news/story?id=348464&cc=5901. 
 91. See Juventus Deserve Bigger Crowds Says Moggi, supra note 16. 
 92. Italian Clubs Need to Cut Prices, REUTERS (Rome), Oct. 5, 2005, http://soccernet. 
espn.go.com/news/story?id=344995&cc=5901. 
 93. See Premier League Probes Crowd Slump, supra note 16. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bookmaker Pays Out on Chelsea Title Victory, REUTERS (London), Sept. 29, 
2005, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=344274&cc=5901. 
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III. A SOLUTION PROPOSED: THE SALARY CAP 
In September of 2005, after watching Chelsea dominate league play 
over the last season and a half of the Premier League, a small-market 
club chairman, Dave Whelan of Wigan Athletic, publicly announced the 
need for a salary cap to restore meaningful competition to the league.96 
He went on to claim that four other club executives would support a 
cap,97 and later claimed that elite clubs Arsenal and Manchester United 
would possibly support one as well.98 Shortly thereafter, Whelan proved 
to be correct when Arsene Wenger, the manager of Arsenal, went public 
with his support for salary restrictions.99 But perhaps the clearest sign 
that European football is ready to consider salary limits came in the form 
of an article written by Joseph Blatter, the president of FIFA. In it, Blat-
ter claims that European football has become a “society of haves and 
have nots,” and hints at setting limits on player salaries.100 Blatter con-
cludes by announcing that he has commissioned a FIFA task force to 
deal with the excessive spending that is “suffocating” the game.101
 
 96. Harris, supra note 17. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Gordon Tynan, Arsenal and United May Back Cap, Says Whelan, INDEPENDENT 
(U.K.), Sept. 23, 2005, http://sport.independent.co.uk/football/news/article314430.ece. 
While Whelan was expressing support for a salary cap in England’s Premier League, in 
order for a cap to be successful it would probably have to be implemented by UEFA and 
apply to all of Europe. A cap in one European country alone would result in a movement 
of top players from that country to other countries whose leagues do not have a salary cap 
and can thus offer higher salaries. Furthermore, this phenomenon could easily be charac-
terized as affecting trade between Community member states, and thus European compe-
tition law would still likely apply. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. As a result, 
though this Note considers a salary cap for all of European football, its basic inquiry 
would be equally relevant to a salary cap in one European country. 
 99. Wenger Supports Top-Flight Salary Limit, Oct. 15, 2005, http://soccernet. 
espn.go.com/news/story?id=345966&cc=5901. 
 100. Joseph Blatter, Greed Threatens the Beautiful Game, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 12, 
2005, at 19. 
 101. Id. Interestingly, these recent calls for salary caps are not the first time restrictions 
on player salaries have been considered by European football. In 2002, an organization of 
eighteen of the most powerful clubs in Europe known as G-14 agreed on a “cost control” 
measure whereby G-14 clubs would not spend more than 70% of their total revenue on 
player salaries. See Top Clubs Agree Salary Cap, BBC SPORT (U.K.), Nov. 5, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/2402329.stm. Though the media referred 
to it as a “salary cap,” the agreement only applied to G-14 members. Furthermore, the 
agreement was a response to the widespread financial problems clubs were facing at the 
time—it was not meant to foster competitive balance. See id. Effectively, the G-14 
agreement has been replaced by UEFA’s licensing system which includes financial crite-
ria also aimed at ensuring that clubs are solvent and credible, rather than dealing with 
issues of competition. See UEFA, UEFA Club Licensing System Manual at 82, March, 
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Though it is not clear what solutions FIFA’s task force may suggest, 
based on success in other sports102—particularly league sports here in the 
United States103—a salary cap would be an effective mechanism for revi-
talizing European football’s lacking competition.104 All four major pro-
 
2002, http://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/22395.pdf. Nothing in the licensing system restricts 
the amount of money a club can spend on players. See id. at 81–161. 
  For more information on the G-14, see G-14, Who We Are, 
http://www.g14.com/main.php (follow “Who We Are” hyperlink) (noting that the pur-
pose of G-14 is to give its 18 member clubs a voice in the development of international 
club football) (last visited on Jan. 25, 2007); G-14, Who We Are—Basics, 
http://www.g14.com/main.php (follow “Basics” hyperlink) (noting that the G-14 is 
mainly concerned with issues of “EC employment legislation, sponsorship and TV rights, 
intellectual copyright, format and management of club and national team competitions”) 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
 102. It is perhaps surprising to learn that salary caps are in effect in other sports within 
Europe. Several rugby leagues within Europe, including the Zurich Premiership, French 
rugby, and the Super League have salary caps ranging from £1.7 million to £2.25 million 
per season. Additionally, in European football, lower English divisions—League One and 
League Two—have voluntary salary caps whereby clubs refrain from spending more than 
60% of their total revenue on player salaries. Richard Mooney & Marjorie Holmes, A 
Question of Sport: Does US Treatment of Football Offer Any Solutions for the UK?, 
COMPETITION L. INSIGHT, Aug. 9, 2005, at 7; Harris, supra note 17. The reason that such 
leagues have caps and have not been investigated by the EC is that they draw media at-
tention and engage in economic activity on a much lower scale than does football at its 
highest national divisions. As such, a salary cap in European football’s “top-flight” would 
surely draw the attention of the EC. See Mooney & Holmes, supra. 
 103. Salary caps in U.S. league sports do not conflict with U.S. antitrust law because in 
the United States, unlike in Europe, contracts between leagues and players are collec-
tively bargained by the league and players’ unions. The National Labor Relations Act 
provides that a majority of employees in a unit may elect a representative of all employ-
ees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1959). Salary 
caps that are included in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) have been deemed 
permissible since invalidating a cap in such cases would unravel the entire CBA, and 
ultimately frustrate the purpose of collective bargaining. See Wood v. Nat’l Basketball 
Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 961–62 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 104. Taking U.S. league sports as our model once again, there are policies other than 
the salary cap that are widely used to promote competitive balance. One such alternative 
is revenue sharing. Revenue sharing plans generally require teams to put a limited 
amount of their local revenue into a league pool which is then distributed so that revenues 
are channeled to teams with below league-average revenues. Major League Baseball 
(MLB), the National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL) all 
have revenue sharing plans. See MLB, 2003–2006 Basic Agreement, Sept. 30, 2002, art. 
XXIV, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf [hereinafter MLB 
CBA]. On November 10, 2006, shortly before publication of this Note, MLB and the 
players association (MLBPA) came to terms on a new CBA that will be in effect for the 
2007–2011 seasons. See Press Release, MLB, MLB, MLBPA Reach Five-Year Labor 
Accord (Nov. 24, 2006), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/ 
press_releases/press_release.jsp?ymd=20061024&content_id=1722380&vkey=pr_mlb&f
2007] BALANCING ACT 723 
                                                                                                             
ext=.jsp&c_id=mlb (As of the publication of this Note, the MLB 2007–2011 CBA has 
not been made publicly available by MLB. Therefore, for purposes of this Note, reference 
will be made to the MLB 2003–2006 CBA which is no longer in effect. All of the por-
tions of the MLB 2003–2006 CBA that are discussed herein, including the competitive 
balance tax, revenue sharing, and the amateur draft, are still in effect under the MLB 
2007–2011 CBA, though some changes to each policy have been made.); NFL, Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players’ 
Association, Mar. 8, 2006 (as amended), art. XXIV, § 11, available at 
http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/Agents/CBA_Amended_2006.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA]; 
NHL, Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and National 
Hockey League Players’ Association, July 22, 2005, art. 49, available at 
http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf [hereinafter NHL CBA]. However, revenue shar-
ing in the United States is fostered by the strength of professional leagues, and the close 
relationship between teams and players as evidenced by collective bargaining. As leagues 
in Europe tend to be looser unions—thus the system of promotion and relegation—where 
clubs are more independent of one another, revenue sharing is not likely to prove worka-
ble. Furthermore, revenue sharing is in some ways more extreme than a salary cap insofar 
as a cap limits a team’s spending, while revenue sharing actually takes a piece of an 
owner’s profits and redistributes it. Given the financial troubles European football is 
currently experiencing, the few owners that do turn a profit would be unlikely to agree to 
a policy that takes a cut of their profit and gives it to a competing club. That said, in 
Europe, broadcast rights to live football matches are generally sold “collectively” by the 
league, which then distributes the proceeds amongst the clubs. This can be seen as a form 
of revenue sharing. This practice is often referred to as “collective selling” or “joint sell-
ing.” Unfortunately for those who stress competitive balance on the field, joint selling is 
largely frowned upon by the EC as anti-competitive off the field since it limits media 
coverage of live matches, and prevents clubs from competing in the sale of rights to 
matches (oh, the irony!). See IVO VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANÇOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION 
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1441–43 (4th ed. 2005) for a discussion of the EC’s 
views on joint selling. 
  Another alternative balancing mechanism to a salary cap employed by U.S. 
leagues is the player draft. Drafts regulate how new players enter a league, and are gener-
ally weighted so that the order in which teams draft is directly related to performance 
from the prior season. Poorly performing teams are allowed to draft ahead of better per-
forming teams, meaning they can select (and thus control) the top talents entering the 
league. The system thus promotes competitive balance. See Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 
855–56. MLB, the NBA, the NFL, and the NHL all have player drafts. See MLB CBA, 
supra, Attachment 24, at 202; NBA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. X, July 29, 
2005, available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles.php [hereinafter NBA CBA]; NFL 
CBA, supra, art. XVI; NHL CBA, supra, art. 8. By contrast, in European football, new 
players can be contracted by any club, and thus often sign with the highest bidder. Since 
the clubs with the most money to offer are often the clubs that traditionally win, this prac-
tice fosters a competitive imbalance. Still, it is unlikely that a player draft could be insti-
tuted in Europe without a major reorganization of European football. Unlike U.S. league 
sports, the market for players in European football spans multiple leagues in multiple 
countries. Organizing one draft for all of Europe is impractical, while organizing a draft 
in only one or two leagues would likely motivate young players to play in leagues that do 
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fessional sports leagues in the United States105 have some form of salary 
cap or cap-like policy in their current collective bargaining agreements 
(CBA).106 Of those four leagues, there is perhaps no better example of 
how the salary cap can balance competition, and in turn enhance the 
popularity and profitability of a sport, than the NFL. In the twenty-one-
year period from 1972–1993, seven of the twenty-eight107 NFL fran-
chises won the Super Bowl a combined total of twenty times, making the 
NFL a league of dynasties.108 Since the NFL instituted the salary cap in 
1993,109 nine different teams have won the thirteen Super Bowls.110 Dur-
ing the “salary cap era” the NFL has become the most profitable sport in 
the United States,111 and, to the enjoyment of many fans, has also be-
come synonymous with parity. 
 
not have drafts where they are free to sign with the highest bidder, and have some control 
over where they play. 
  Since these alternative methods of promoting competitive balance do not seem 
practical for European football to adopt, this Note only considers mechanisms that limit 
spending on player salaries such as a salary cap. 
 105. They are Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association 
(NBA), the National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL). 
 106. MLB has a “competitive balance tax”. See MLB CBA, supra note 104, art. XXIII. 
Note that the “competitive balance tax” remains a part of the current MLB 2007–2011 
CBA. See Press Release, MLB, MLB, MLBPA Reach Five-Year Labor Accord, supra 
note 104. The NBA, NFL, and NHL all have salary caps. See NBA CBA, supra note 104, 
art. VII; NFL CBA, supra note 104, art. XXIV; NHL CBA, supra note 104, art. 50, § 
50.5. 
 107. From 1972–1976 there were twenty-six NFL teams. In 1976 the Seattle Seahawks 
and Tampa Bay Buccaneers were added to the league, and from 1976–1993 there were 
twenty-eight NFL teams. Currently, the NFL has thirty-two teams after expansion in 
1995, 1999, and 2002. See Chronological History of the Modern National Football 
League, http://www.vaughantech.com/nfl.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 108. The Cowboys (three), Dolphins (two), 49ers (four), Giants (two), Raiders (three, 
twice in Oakland and once in Los Angeles), Redskins (three), and Steelers (four) won all 
but one Super Bowl from 1972–1993. The Bears in 1985 were the only team to win once 
and never repeat. See Super Bowl Recaps, http://www.superbowl.com/history/ 
recaps (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 109. See Richard A. Kaplan, The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A Misguided Regulatory 
Regime, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1625 (2004). 
 110. Only the Broncos (twice), Cowboys (twice), and Patriots (three times) have won 
the Super Bowl more than once since the salary cap was introduced. See Super Bowl 
Recaps, supra note 108. 
 111. In 2003, the thirty-two NFL teams had a combined operating cost of $851 million 
and revenue of $5.3 billion. See Michael K. Ozanian, Football Fiefdoms, FORBES.COM, 
Sept. 3, 2004, available at http://www.forbes.com/business/2004/09/02/cz_kb_0902 
nflintro.html. In 2005, the average NFL team was valued at $898 million compared with 
$376 million in baseball. See Kurt Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian, & Maya Roney, 
The Tape on Tagliabue, FORBES.COM, Sept. 1, 2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
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The basic idea of a salary cap is rather simple: limit the amount of 
money a team can spend on player salaries.112 However, in U.S. leagues, 
salary caps are often complex policies that reflect the profitability of the 
sport, as well as the balance of power between the league and the play-
ers’ union, and thus vary from league to league. This Note will consider 
two types of salary caps as possible solutions for European football: the 
“hard cap” and the “luxury tax.”113 The NFL institutes a so-called hard 
cap, whereby no team can spend more than the designated limit on total 
player salary at any time.114 The hard cap is the most restrictive form of 
team salary cap,115 and the most effective at striking competitive balance. 
It completely separates financial resources from success on the field. 
A luxury tax, by contrast, is technically not a salary cap, but a cap-like 
restriction, since it does not impose an absolute ceiling on player salary. 
 
2006/08/31/paul-tagliabue-nfl_cz_mo_06nfl_0831nflintro.html; Michael K. Ozanian, The 
Business of Baseball, Forbes.com, Apr. 20, 2006, available  
at http://www.forbes.com/2006/04/17/06mlb_baseball-teamvaluationscx_mo_0420sports. 
html. 
 112. In U.S. sports leagues, the designated limit that a team can spend is usually equal 
to a percentage of the average team revenue. By contrast, those who have talked about 
having a cap in Europe often support an agreement whereby each club will not spend 
more than a fixed percentage of its own revenue as opposed to the average revenue. See 
Wenger Supports Top-Flight Salary Limit, supra note 99; Top Clubs Agree Salary Cap, 
BBC SPORT (U.K.), supra note 101. It is easy to see how such an agreement is self-
serving of big-market clubs and would do little to effectively create a competitive bal-
ance. A limited percentage of the revenue of big-market clubs, which tend to take in more 
revenue, will almost always afford them much greater spending room than that same 
percentage of revenue of small-market clubs. 
 113. This Note does not consider other types of caps, including the “soft cap.” Soft 
caps set a limit on spending, however, teams are allowed to spend over that limit to some 
extent. The NBA has a soft salary cap whereby teams can use league-approved “cap ex-
ceptions” to spend over the cap limit. See NBA CBA, supra note 104, art. VII, § 6. The 
NBA allows nine exceptions which teams often use. Soft caps are not considered here 
because they generally require defined situations when a team is allowed to spend over 
the cap limit, and the policy considerations required to define such cases in European 
football are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 114. See NFL CBA, supra note 104, art. XXIV, § 4; id. art. XXV. 
 115. A distinction can be made between “individual caps,” which limit the amount of 
money a team can pay an individual player, and “team caps,” which limit the amount of 
money a team dedicates to total player salaries. Both the NBA and NHL have individual 
as well as team salary caps. See NBA CBA, supra note 104, art. VII, § 5; NHL CBA, 
supra note 104, art. 50, § 50.6. Individual player caps are more restrictive than team sal-
ary caps since under a team cap there is no limit as to what a team owner can pay an indi-
vidual player so long as the amount paid on total player salaries does not exceed the cap 
limit. Since an individual cap accomplishes a similar end, yet is more restrictive than a 
team cap, it is more likely to be struck down by European competition law, and thus indi-
vidual caps are not considered here. 
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Under MLB’s luxury tax system, a spending threshold is set, and teams 
can choose to spend over the threshold, but will be taxed a fixed percent-
age for every dollar so spent.116 Such policies keep spending lower, but 
do not totally restrict owners’ freedom to spend, and thus bigger market 
teams will still usually maintain a slight advantage. 
Though it seems that a salary cap (hard cap or luxury tax) can effec-
tively deal with European football’s lack of competitive balance, and 
there is support for such a measure among prominent figures within the 
sport, doubts remain as to whether the EC would view a salary cap as a 
violation of European competition law.117 The next two parts of this Note 
explore this question. Part IV will review relevant European law, while 
Part V will apply the law to both a hard cap and a luxury tax, and con-
trast outcomes. 
IV. EC COMPETITION LAW AND SPORTS 
A. Articles 81 and 82 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty govern competition in pan-
European markets. We will first examine Article 82, which prohibits 
abuse of a dominant position within the European market that may affect 
trade between member states.118 Then we will take up the more complex 
 
 116. See MLB CBA, supra note 104, art. XXIII, § B. Interestingly, MLB has named its 
luxury tax the “competitive balance tax.” The tax proceeds are used by the league to pay 
for player benefits, to fund projects to promote baseball in developing countries and areas 
where baseball is not widely played, and to reinforce MLB’s Industry Growth Fund. See 
MLB CBA, supra note 104, art. XXIII, § H. 
 117. This concern is based on the fact that European football clubs are competitors in 
the market for players, and thus a salary cap would be seen as an agreement among com-
petitors. 
 118. Article 82 reads as follows: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly im-
posing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) 
limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making 
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
plementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial us-
age, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.  
EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 82. For a comprehensive explanation of Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty, see VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 104, at 115–32. 
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Article 81. Case law defines “dominant position” under Article 82 as “a 
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking119 which en-
ables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent inde-
pendently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consum-
ers.”120 In Bosman, Advocate General Lenz, in his advisory opinion,121 
applied Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome122 to the transfer system.123 Ul-
timately Lenz concluded that the transfer system did not violate Article 
86 because it restricted competition between clubs insofar as they can 
contract players, and players are not “competitors, customers or consum-
ers” in relation to clubs.124 Similarly, a salary cap is a restriction of com-
petition between clubs in the market for players, and since it would not 
affect the relationship between clubs and “competitors, customers or 
consumers,” it follows that there would be no violation of Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty. 
The real challenge to the legality of a salary cap in European football 
comes from Article 81, which prohibits agreements between undertak-
ings that restrict competition and affect trade between member states.125 
 
 119. For purposes of Articles 81 and 82, an “undertaking” is defined quite broadly as 
“every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity 
and the way in which it is financed.” See Case C-41/90, Höfner & Elsner v. Macrotron 
GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. I-1979, ¶ 21. 
 120. Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 65. 
 121. Recall that as part of the structure of the ECJ, Advocate Generals provide “advi-
sory opinions” to the court before it rules on novel issues. See supra note 11. 
 122. Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome is now embodied in Article 82 of the EC Treary. 
See supra note 51. 
 123. Bosman, 1995 E.R.C. at I-5036–I-5039. 
 124. Id. at I-5038–I-5039. 
 125. Article 82 reads as follows: 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market, and in particular those which: (a) di-
rectly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading condi-
tions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar condi-
tions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them 
at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this 
Article shall be automatically void. 3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, 
however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:—any agreement or category 
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Article 81 accomplishes its purpose in three parts: 81(1) lays out conduct 
that is prohibited as anti-competitive; 81(2) renders conduct that falls 
within 81(1) automatically void; and 81(3) sets forth requirements for 
exemptions to Article 81.126 Articles 81(1) and 81(3) are somewhat com-
plex and for purposes of this Note, they will be broken down into their 
general material requirements.127
The “agreements” prohibited by 81(1) are broadly interpreted so as to 
encompass any joint intention of undertakings regarding specific conduct 
in a market.128 In addition to agreements between undertakings, anti-
competitive decisions made by “associations of undertakings”129 are also 
prohibited by 81(1). 
Agreements fall within 81(1) only if they prevent, restrict, or distort 
competition.130 Agreements can prevent, restrict, or distort competition 
by either their object,131 or effect.132 Furthermore, 81(1) only applies if 
 
of agreements between undertakings;—any decision or category of decisions 
by associations of undertakings;—any concerted practice or category of con-
certed practices, which contributes to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on 
the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the at-
tainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in ques-
tion. 
EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 81. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Because of the complexity of Article 81 and its case law, it is difficult to present 
in the concise fashion required by this Note. What follows is a simple outline of the mate-
rial terms of Articles 81(1) and 81(3). Footnotes are included to further qualify these 
terms. The narrow purpose of this outline is to provide a basic framework for the analysis 
that follows, and nothing more. For a more complete discussion of Article 81 see VAN 
BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 105, at 27–113. 
 128. Case T-1/89, Rhône-Poulenc v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-867, ¶ 120. 
 129. “Associations of undertakings” are essentially groups of undertakings acting in 
concert through an intermediary organization rather than through direct agreements. “As-
sociations” include bodies entrusted with statutory functions. See Case C-309/99, Wout-
ers v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577, ¶¶ 
50–71. Furthermore, associations of undertakings can be regarded as undertakings them-
selves, insofar as they engage in economic activity. See Bosman, 1995 E.R.C at I-5027. 
 130. See supra note 125. 
 131. Agreements which restrict competition by object are:  
those that by their very nature have the potential of restricting competition. 
These are restrictions which in light of the objectives pursued by the Commu-
nity competition rules have such a high potential of negative effects on compe-
tition that it is unnecessary for the purposes of applying Article 81(1) to dem-
onstrate any actual effects on the market.  
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the ultimate effect of the restriction on competition is “appreciable.”133 
Additionally, this appreciable restriction must affect a defined common 
market.134 Finally, it must not be forgotten that Article 81 only applies to 
agreements that affect trade between member states.135
Agreements within Article 81(1) are automatically voided by Article 
81(2), unless they qualify for an exemption under 81(3). Article 81(3) 
allows agreements to stand if their pro-competitive benefits outweigh 
their restrictive effects.136 An agreement must satisfy four conditions in 
 
See European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 
2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, 100. 
 132. If an agreement is not restrictive of competition by object, its effect may restrict 
competition if it “affect[s] actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the 
relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of 
goods and services can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability.” See id. 
 133. Although the requirement of an appreciable effect on competition is not included 
in the text of 81(1), it is formalized in the Commission’s De Minimis Notice of 2001. 
Accordingly, an agreement between actual or potential competitors will not be deemed to 
appreciably restrict competition if the aggregate market share held by the parties to the 
agreement does not exceed 10%. Such agreements will not be caught by 81(1). See Euro-
pean Commission, Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do 
not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (De Minimis), 2001 O.J. (C 368) 13. 
 134. Defining relevant markets requires a two-part analysis—defining the relevant 
product market, and defining the relevant geographic market. Defining the relevant prod-
uct market involves assessing “all those products and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteris-
tics, their prices and their intended use.” Defining the relevant geographic market in-
volves assessing “the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the sup-
ply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are suffi-
ciently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because 
the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas.” See European 
Commission, Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Pur-
poses of Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) ¶¶ 7–8. 
 135. Establishing an effect on trade between member states involves three elements—
the concept of “trade,” establishing “effect,” and establishing that the effect is appreciable 
(note, this third analysis is independent of the finding that an agreement works an “appre-
ciable” restriction of competition). “Trade” is defined broadly to include “all cross-border 
economic activity.” European Commission, Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept 
Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 81, 83. Establishing an 
“effect” requires that “it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probabil-
ity on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that the agreement or practice 
may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade be-
tween Member States.” Id. Appreciability is a fact-sensitive inquiry that considers “the 
nature of the agreement and practice, the nature of the products covered and the market 
position of the undertakings concerned.” Id. at 85. 
 136. See European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty, supra note 131, at 102. 
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order to qualify for an exception under Article 81(3).137 The first condi-
tion is that the agreement must create efficiency gains by improving pro-
duction or distribution of goods or services, or by promoting technical or 
economic progress.138 The second condition requires that a fair share of 
the benefits created by the agreement be passed on to consumers.139 The 
third condition under 81(3) is that the restrictions must be indispensable 
to achieving the efficiencies created.140 Lastly, under the fourth condition 
of 81(3), the agreement in question cannot afford the parties the opportu-
nity to eliminate “competition in respect of a substantial part of the prod-
ucts concerned.”141
B. Competition Law and Sports 
In the years after the Bosman decision, as the EC sharpened its focus 
on European football and sports in general, it recognized that the applica-
tion of competition law must take into account certain characteristics that 
are unique to sports. The EC is not concerned with regulations that are 
essential to a sport. If the regulation in question is inherent to a particular 
sport, its organization, or the organization of competitions within that 
sport, so that without such a regulation the sport would not be able to 
exist, the regulation will not fall within Article 81(1) regardless of its 
restrictive effect on competition.142 Thus, if the hard cap or the luxury 
tax is determined to be essential to European football, Article 81(1) will 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Only objective benefits to the market are measured in applying the first condition. 
Specifically, the Commission will take into account the nature of the claimed efficien-
cies; the causal link between the agreement and the efficiencies; the likelihood and mag-
nitude of the claimed efficiencies; how and when each of the claimed efficiencies would 
be achieved; and any costs incurred in achieving the efficiencies. See id. at 104–05. 
 139. “Consumers” under 81(3) are the customers of the parties to the agreement in 
question. See id. at 109. 
 140. This condition functions as a least restrictive means test, whereby there cannot be 
any other economically practical and less restrictive means of creating the same efficien-
cies. However, it is important to note that the Commission holds that it will not question 
the business judgment of the parties by analyzing hypothetical or theoretical alternatives. 
Rather, the Commission will only intervene under this condition where it is reasonably 
clear that other realistic and attainable alternatives are available. See id. at 107–08. 
 141. Determining whether competition is eliminated depends on the degree of competi-
tion prior to the agreement, and on the degree to which competition is reduced by the 
agreement. See id. at 113. “Competition” for purposes of this final condition of Article 
81(3) is referring to competitors in the industry, who are not a party to the agreement in 
question. 
 142. See Mario Monti, European Comm’r for Competition, Competition and Sport, 
Address at the Rules of the Game Conference (Feb. 26, 2001), available at 
http://www.governance-in-sport.com/GIS%20doc.pdf. 
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not apply. The EC applied this test in dismissing a complaint against 
UEFA in 2002. ENIC, a company that owned controlling interest in five 
European football clubs, petitioned the EC under Article 81 to strike 
down a UEFA rule that prohibited one company from owning more than 
one club in UEFA competitions.143 The EC found that though the rule 
had a restrictive effect, such effects were “inherent in the pursuit of the 
very existence of credible pan European football competitions.”144 Since 
the rule was necessary and proportionate to the need to maintain the pub-
lic’s perception that UEFA competitions were genuine, and without such 
a perception long-term competition would prove impossible, the rule fell 
outside Article 81(1).145
The EC has also recognized that competition in sports is different from 
competition in other industries. In sports, it is not within a competitor’s 
economic interest to put other competitors out of business, rather compe-
tition is necessary for the very existence and success of sports.146 This 
means that some interdependence among competitors is inherent in 
sports.147 Furthermore, as the ECJ concluded in Bosman, the EC has rec-
ognized the need to preserve uncertainty as to results and to maintain a 
degree of equality among competitors as legitimate aims that are essen-
tial to sports.148
V. ANALYSIS 
The following analysis considers the legality of a UEFA-implemented 
hard salary cap, and a UEFA-implemented luxury tax in light of Article 
81. It is, to some extent, unnatural to consider both policies since UEFA 
 
 143. European Commission, Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/UEFA, 2002. 
 144. The Commission found that without such a rule, two clubs with one owner could 
be forced to play each other in UEFA competitions. As a result, fans could lose confi-
dence in the honesty of the competition, and ultimately lose interest which would devalue 
the sport. Id. ¶ 32. 
 145. Id. ¶ 38. Though the EC has held that this inquiry is unique to sports, the underly-
ing logic does extend to virtually all sectors. If an industry cannot exist without certain 
restrictions on competition, those restrictions must be allowed to stand. See Wouters, 
2002 E.C.R. at ¶¶ 73–110, where the ECJ held that a prohibition by the Dutch Bar on 
partnerships between bar members and other professions (including accountants) did not 
fall within Article 81(1) because it was reasonable to conclude that such a regulation was 
necessary for the proper practice of law within the Netherlands. 
 146. By contrast, in almost all other industries, it is within an undertaking’s interest to 
eliminate weaker competition and take over their market share. See Monti, supra note 
142. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See European Commission, The Helsinki Report on Sport, at ¶ 4.2.1.3, COM 
(1999) 644 final, (Dec. 10, 1999), reprinted in RICHARD PARRISH, SPORTS LAW AND 
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 243, 248. 
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is likely to adopt one or the other, but not both.149 The EC would then 
review the legality of whichever policy UEFA chose to implement.150
Insofar as the analysis of the hard cap and the luxury tax overlap, they 
are analyzed together in order to avoid redundancy. For the most part, 
however, they are considered separately. The first part of the analysis 
applies Article 81(1), and considers whether the hard cap or the luxury 
tax can be characterized as essential to European football and thus fall 
outside of Article 81(1). The second part applies Article 81(3), and the 
third part offers additional considerations. 
A. Article 81(1) 
Both a UEFA hard cap and a luxury tax would satisfy many of the re-
quirements of Article 81(1). UEFA is an “association of associations of 
undertakings.”151 Therefore a hard cap or luxury tax imposed by UEFA 
would be a decision by an association of associations of undertakings 
within the meaning of Article 81(1).   
 
 149. Although it is likely that UEFA itself would conduct an analysis similar to ours as 
it must assess the legality of all policies that it considers adopting. 
 150. On May 1, 2004, the procedure for implementing European competition law was 
revised. New procedures give competition authorities of member states, national courts of 
Community member states, and the EC the power to implement Articles 81 and 82. See 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition Laid Down Under Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L1) 
7–9. Prior to these changes UEFA would have been able to notify the EC that it adopted a 
luxury tax or a hard cap, and request that the EC review the legality of its action thereby 
securing temporary immunity from fines even if the EC determined that the policy in 
question violated competition law. Now, however, notifications are no longer possible, 
and UEFA must assess the legality of its actions at the risk of being fined for violations 
of competition law. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 104, at 1024–25. Notwithstand-
ing these rule changes, it is likely that the EC and not national courts or national competi-
tion authorities would review UEFA actions because they often affect many member 
states. See id. at 1026–27. 
 151. See ENIC/UEFA, supra note 143, ¶ 25. Professional clubs are undertakings inso-
far as they engage in economic activity. National associations which group clubs together 
are associations of undertakings. Thus, UEFA, which groups together national associa-
tions within Europe, is an association of associations of undertakings. 
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Both a hard cap and a luxury tax are forms of horizontal152 agreements 
that typically fall within 81(1) because they restrict competition in either 
object or effect. While UEFA could argue that the narrow object of a 
hard cap or a luxury tax is to improve competitive balance within Euro-
pean football, it would have to concede that the effect of such regulations 
restricts competition in the market for players. In the case of a hard cap, a 
club that is at or near the spending limit would not be able to compete 
with other clubs for the services of any player whose salary would bring 
the club above the limit. In the case of a luxury tax, a club that is at or 
near the tax threshold, though free to compete for the services of players, 
will be taxed for taking on salary in excess of the threshold, and thus 
competition is at least distorted, if not inhibited. 
Clearly the market for players is one of the relevant markets affected 
by a hard cap or luxury tax. This market represents the “upstream” mar-
ket where clubs compete to purchase players’ services which are neces-
sary for the finished product: a football match. However, the market for 
players is not the only relevant market under 81(1) analysis. The “down-
stream” selling market where football is sold to spectators, media, and 
other consumers, would also be affected.153 This market would benefit 
from an improved product—more competitively balanced football with 
less predictable results—as a result of a salary cap or luxury tax. The 
effect of a UEFA hard cap or luxury tax on both the upstream market for 
players and the downstream selling market is sure to be appreciable since 
clubs organized under UEFA represent 100% of the professional Euro-
pean football market.154
Finally, a hard cap or luxury tax would certainly affect trade between 
member states. One example of such an effect can be seen in situations 
where clubs from one member state transfer players to clubs in other 
member states. Under a hard cap, a club from one member state will not 
be able to transfer a player to a club in another member state if the salary 
 
 152. “Horizontal” agreements are agreements entered into by companies “operating at 
the same level(s) in the market.” See European Commission, Guidelines on the Applica-
bility of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J.  
(C 3) 2. A hard cap or luxury tax would be an agreement among clubs, with all clubs 
operating at the same level within the market for European football—all clubs are buyers 
in the sense that they have to contract players, a stadium, etc., and sellers in that they 
participate in matches and competitions, to which they can sell tickets, broadcast rights, 
etc. 
 153. For a description of the process of defining relevant markets, and use of the terms 
“upstream” and “downstream” markets, see VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 104, at 143–
44.  
 154. Indeed, UEFA has been accused of operating as a monopoly in professional Euro-
pean football. See, e.g., ENIC/UEFA, supra note 143, ¶ 15. 
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of the player being transferred would raise the transferee club’s payroll 
above the spending limit. In the case of a luxury tax, while a transfer 
could go through even if the transferee club’s payroll would exceed the 
tax threshold, the transferee club would be taxed, and possibly refrain 
from such a transfer as a result. 
Thus far, both a UEFA hard cap and a UEFA luxury tax would fall 
within Article 81(1). However, it is still necessary to consider whether 
such restrictions can be characterized as inherent to European football. 
The decisive question is this: can European football, particularly national 
competitions, continue to exist in the long term without a hard cap or a 
luxury tax? If the answer is yes, then 81(1) will apply and we must con-
tinue our analysis by applying 81(3). However, if the answer is no, then 
81(1) will not apply, the restrictions will be consistent with competition 
law, and our inquiry will end. 
The basic argument that some restriction on player salary is necessary 
to the long-term existence of European football can be used to defend 
either a hard cap or a luxury tax. UEFA can claim that without such re-
strictions, the lopsided dominance of large-market clubs in recent 
years155 will continue. A continued imbalance in competition on the field 
means that results will remain predictable, and spectators will lose inter-
est in the sport. Ultimately, European football will lose all marketability 
as spectators, advertisers, and broadcasters all turn away. Essentially, 
UEFA would be arguing that without restrictions on the upstream mar-
ket, where clubs purchase players’ services, the downstream market, 
where football matches are sold, would cease to exist. Since the upstream 
market is dependent on the downstream market, restrictions on competi-
tion in the upstream market (a hard cap or a luxury tax) are necessary. 
This argument is strong in light of the fact that it comports with the EC’s 
reasoning in dismissing ENIC’s claim against UEFA,156 and promotes 
 
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 83–95. 
 156. The EC held in relevant part:  
Without the UEFA rule, the proper functioning of the market where the clubs 
develop their economic activities would be under threat, since the public’s per-
ception that the underlying sporting competition is fair and honest is an essen-
tial precondition to keep its interest and marketability. If UEFA competitions 
were not credible and consumers did not have the perception that the games 
played represent honest sporting competition between the participants, the 
competitions would be devalued with the inevitable consequence over time of 
lower consumer confidence, interest and marketability. Without a solid sporting 
foundation, clubs would be less capable of extracting value from ancillary ac-
tivities and investment in clubs would lose value. 
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aims that both the EC and the ECJ have recognized as legitimate.157 
However, this argument is too broad, and the EC is sure to push UEFA to 
justify its choice of one policy over the other. Taking a closer look at a 
hard cap and a luxury tax separately, each policy has different strengths 
and weaknesses that the EC would certainly consider, and which it may 
find dispositive. 
Once UEFA establishes that there is a lack of competitive balance in 
European football and that the consequences are potentially devastating 
to the sport, it is difficult to argue that a hard salary cap would not sub-
stantially benefit the sport. By separating player budget from revenue, a 
hard cap would effectively redistribute top talent among clubs so that a 
competitive balance on the field is restored. However, a hard cap is per-
haps the most restrictive spending limit employed in professional sports, 
placing an unconditional ceiling on spending. The EC, which stresses 
that restraints on competition be proportional to their desired effects,158 
would likely frown on the harshness of a hard cap. As a result, less re-
strictive policies would be preferred alternatives. UEFA, in defending a 
hard cap, would be forced to argue that less restrictive policies would not 
provide enough of a competitive balance to render results unpredictable. 
However, the hard cap is such an extreme measure, one that would fun-
damentally alter the balance of power in European football, that the EC 
would likely have a hard time accepting the argument that without such 
drastic change the sport could not continue to exist. This is particularly 
true in light of the fact that less restrictive practices have effectively bal-
anced competition in other sports.159 Ultimately, because of its restrictive 
 
ENIC/UEFA, supra note 143, ¶ 32. Recall that in this decision the EC was considering a 
UEFA rule prohibiting one entity from owning controlling interest in more than one club 
participating in the same UEFA competition. Public perception that the clubs participat-
ing in a competition are balanced so that the outcome is not entirely predictable is like-
wise a precondition to continued interest in, and marketability of European football. 
 157. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 158. Before dismissing ENIC’s complaint against UEFA, the EC held that “the rule 
does not seem to go beyond what is necessary to ensure its legitimate aim. . . .” 
ENIC/UEFA, supra note 143, ¶ 41. Similarly, in Bosman, Advocate General Lenz stated 
in his opinion that only restrictions which are “indispensable” to achieving a legitimate 
aim fall outside of 81(1). See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5033. 
 159. MLB’s luxury tax is an obvious alternative. MLB first instituted the luxury tax in 
the 2002–2006 CBA which recently expired. The tax has coincided with unprecedented 
parity among MLB teams both economically, and in terms of on-the-field results. In the 
five years from 2002–2006 that the luxury tax has been in effect, five different teams 
have won the World Series. See Barry M. Bloom, MLB, Union Announce New Labor 
Deal, MLB.COM, Nov. 10, 2006, http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061024& 
content_id=1722211&vkey=ps2006news&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb. Furthermore, on the 
heels of signing a new five-year CBA which extends the luxury tax, players’ salaries in 
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effect on competition, the EC is likely to reject the argument that a hard 
cap is necessary to European football. As a result, the hard cap is likely 
to fall within Article 81(1), and will be rendered void unless it qualifies 
for an exemption under 81(3). 
Turning to the luxury tax, its strengths and weaknesses are the inverse 
of those of the hard cap. Since a luxury tax only penalizes clubs for 
spending over the tax threshold, and imposes no absolute limits on a 
club’s ability to spend, the EC will not find that it greatly restricts com-
petition. Still, the EC might question the effectiveness of a luxury tax. A 
luxury tax will allow big market clubs the choice to pay the tax in order 
to keep top players. If a luxury tax cannot create enough of a competitive 
balance to fix European football’s problem, UEFA cannot claim that it is 
essential to the economic viability of the sport. However, it is unlikely 
that the EC would press this issue since defeating the luxury tax for its 
lack of effectiveness would only encourage UEFA to adopt a more re-
strictive practice such as the hard cap.160 The EC is more likely to defer 
to UEFA’s judgment that a luxury tax will balance competition. Assum-
ing that the EC accepts UEFA’s basic argument that player salaries need 
to be restricted, there is a strong possibility that the EC would find that a 
luxury tax is essential to credible competition in national European foot-
ball leagues. Thus, a luxury tax would fall outside of Article 81(1). How-
 
MLB’s 2006–2007 free agency period are up an estimated 70% over last year. See Maury 
Brown, The Ledger Domain: Why the Free Spending?, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, Dec. 4, 
2006, http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=5741. Some within base-
ball have attributed this increase in spending to enhanced parity. See id. While it is un-
clear to what extent the current parity within MLB is attributable to the luxury tax rather 
than other mechanisms such as revenue sharing, since 2002 only three teams have spent 
in excess of the tax threshold. See Yankees and Red Sox Hit with Luxury Tax, BIZ OF 
BASEBALL, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=560&Itemid=42. While some argue that this is evidence that the 
luxury tax is ineffective (since there are some teams that are willing to pay the tax), it is 
likely that the tax has impacted the spending decisions that large-market teams have 
made since 2002. See Neil deMause, Ghosts of 2002, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, Dec. 5, 
2005, http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4638. 
  It is not unlikely that the EC might look to MLB’s luxury tax as a possibility since 
European discussion of sport governance often involves a look across the Atlantic at 
methods implemented in the United States. See, e.g., Szymanski & Valletti, supra note 
24, at 2. Furthermore, as far back as 1997 the EC has been aware of the idea of taxing 
teams that spend over a set amount of money on player salary. See Karel Van Miert, 
Competition Comm’r, European Comm’n, Sport et Concurrence: Dévelopments Récents 
et Action de La Commission (Nov. 27, 1997) (transcript in French), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1997_069_fr.html. 
 160. Other alternatives such as revenue sharing and a player entry draft have already 
been dismissed. See supra note 104. 
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ever, for purposes of this Note, we will also apply Article 81(3) to the 
luxury tax to determine if it might qualify for an exemption in the event 
the EC would apply Article 81(1). 
B. Article 81(3) 
Recall that exemptions under Article 81(3) are efficiency-based in that 
restrictions are allowed to stand if the benefits created outweigh the re-
strictions on competition. This inquiry not only considers what benefits 
are created for consumers, but also whether the restrictions in question 
are the least restrictive means of creating such benefits. Ultimately, 81(3) 
analysis will mirror the 81(1) analysis,161 and as a result, the respective 
strengths and weaknesses of a hard cap and a luxury tax considered in 
81(1) analysis will remain significant in 81(3) analysis. Our inquiry here 
is guided by Article 81(3)’s four conditions. The fourth condition—that 
the restriction in question cannot eliminate competition in respect to the 
products concerned—can be dismissed outright since it is clear that nei-
ther a hard cap nor a luxury tax imposed by UEFA would prevent clubs 
that are not organized under UEFA from competing in the market for 
players’ services.162 In considering 81(3)’s first three conditions, the hard 
cap and the luxury tax will be taken up separately. 
In the case of a hard cap, it seems that the first two conditions of an 
81(3) exemption will be easily satisfied. Read together, the first two con-
ditions require that a hard cap creates a benefit that is passed on to the 
customers of the parties to the hard cap agreement. It has been estab-
lished that a hard cap would limit the amount any club could spend on 
players in the upstream market. Such limits will improve competitive 
balance amongst clubs, creating less predictable results, which means a 
better product is being sold to spectators, advertisers, and media in the 
downstream market. Thus it seems a hard cap would create an improved 
 
 161. The inquiry under 81(3) is slightly narrower in focus than our inquiry under 81(1). 
Under 81(1), we asked whether a hard cap or luxury tax was necessary for the existence 
of European football. Under 81(3), we first ask how a hard cap or luxury tax will improve 
European football, and then ask whether they are necessary to create such efficiencies. 
 162. This condition is actually moot for purposes of our inquiry since it is principally 
aimed at protecting competitors that are not a party to the agreement in question from 
being squeezed out of the market. However, in the case of a UEFA hard cap or luxury 
tax, all professional European football clubs would be a party to the agreement (all pro-
fessional European football clubs are organized under UEFA) and, therefore, for pur-
poses of this fourth condition, there is no competition to be eliminated. Furthermore, a 
hard cap and a luxury tax seek to enhance competition between clubs, and do nothing to 
prevent new clubs from coming into existence. 
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product163 that is being passed on to the consumers, thereby satisfying 
the first two conditions. However, it is not clear that a hard cap would 
satisfy the third condition under 81(3). The third condition requires that a 
hard cap be the least restrictive means of creating the benefit of improved 
competitive balance and less predictable results. The luxury tax is clearly 
a less restrictive measure, and one that the EC might consider.164 While 
UEFA will not have the burden of proving that a hard cap is necessary to 
the existence of European football, as it did under 81(1), defending a 
hard cap under a least restrictive means test is not an easy task. Essen-
tially, UEFA will have to convince the EC that a hard cap instills com-
petitive balance to an extent that less restrictive policies cannot match.165 
Additionally, UEFA will have to argue that the benefit of the extra parity 
that only a hard cap can yield outweighs, and thus justifies, the hard 
cap’s greater restrictive effect on off-the-field competition. The EC 
would likely reject such a defense of the hard cap. The EC and ECJ have 
recognized that a degree of equality among clubs is a legitimate aim for 
sports. This does not mean that the almost perfect equality created by a 
hard cap is necessary or even desired. Parity must be imposed so that 
results are no longer predictable, and nothing more. Thus, the EC would 
not value the extreme balance created by a hard cap, and would likely 
find that it is not the least restrictive means of instilling competitive bal-
ance in European football. As such, a hard cap would not qualify for an 
exemption under Article 81(3) and thus would be void under Article 
81(2). 
In analyzing the luxury tax, the first two conditions under 81(3)—that 
a benefit be created and passed on to customers—represent a bigger ob-
stacle than the third condition. The luxury tax does not eliminate the fi-
nancial advantage that large-market clubs have in the upstream market, 
the way the hard cap does. However, it does penalize clubs for making 
use of that advantage and thus they may be less likely to do so. While the 
luxury tax will never foster equality to the extent the hard cap does, it 
would still likely improve competitive balance and, in turn, add to the 
unpredictability of results by allowing small-market clubs a better chance 
to contract top players. These effects amount to an improved product on 
 
 163. Improved goods and services are generally considered a legitimate form of effi-
ciency gain under 81(3). See European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty, supra note 131, at 107. 
 164. See supra note 159, ¶ 2. 
 165. While UEFA could alternatively argue that all policies that are less restrictive 
than a hard cap will fail to instill any competitive balance, evidence, at least in the case of 
MLB’s luxury tax, does not entirely support such an argument. See Neil deMause, supra 
note 159. 
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the field. As such, the EC will recognize that the luxury tax does create a 
benefit, and therefore satisfies the first condition. Since this improved 
product is sold directly to customers in the downstream market, the lux-
ury tax would also satisfy the second condition. 
The third condition of Article 81(3) requires that the luxury tax be the 
least restrictive means of improving competitive balance. Though the tax 
might deter some large-market clubs from spending in excess of the 
threshold, clubs can still determine for themselves how much to spend on 
players. Few balancing mechanisms are as deferential to natural market 
forces, and as a result, the luxury tax is likely to pass a least restrictive 
means test. Thus the luxury tax would qualify for an exemption under 
Article 81(3) in the event that the EC applies Article 81(1). 
C. Final Considerations 
On balance, the luxury tax seems to have a better chance of surviving 
Article 81 scrutiny; whether it be through a determination that 81(1) does 
not apply, or through an 81(3) exemption. The EC’s potential argument 
that the hard cap is not the least restrictive means of creating competitive 
balance and less predictable results appears to be a strong one. On the 
other hand, the argument that the luxury tax would not be effective at 
imposing competitive balance and adding to the unpredictability of re-
sults is weak in light of its effectiveness at balancing the market for play-
ers in MLB.166 Furthermore, in light of the EC’s distaste for restrictive 
practices, the broad and diverse range of markets represented by UEFA, 
and the powerful interests of both the players’ union FIFPro and influen-
tial large-market clubs (such as the G-14167) that wish to sustain their 
popularity, the luxury tax seems to be a more moderate policy that better 
accommodates the varying agendas of the loose association that is Euro-
pean football. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In analyzing European football’s problem of a lack of competitive bal-
ance, and searching for a solution, a few significant conclusions emerge. 
First, with few exceptions, the EC and the ECJ are going to subject 
European football, and all sports, to the same standards as other indus-
tries in Europe. This is evident in the Bosman decision and throughout 
the EC amendments to the transfer system. Compliance with European 
law can sometimes conflict with the interests of European football. In 
such conflicts, the law often wins out, and to some extent, this phenome-
 
 166. See supra note 159. 
 167. See G-14, Who We Are—Basics, supra note 101. 
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non has contributed to European football’s current problem of poor com-
petitive balance. 
Second, irrespective of its causes, it is clear that European football is 
lacking competitive balance. Over the last few seasons in national com-
petitions across Europe, large-market clubs have dominated consistently, 
and by such a substantial margin, that supporters of small-market clubs 
have no hope that their clubs will realistically compete for their respec-
tive league championship. This problem has affected ticket sales, and has 
caused certain people within the sport to call for action to remedy the 
situation. 
This Note suggests that a luxury tax is a viable solution that comports 
with European competition law better than a hard salary cap. That said, 
competition law is not the only obstacle to instituting a luxury tax in 
European football. Other practical considerations not explored here re-
main relevant. Chief among such considerations are the interests of 
large-market club owners, and the players themselves, who might prefer 
a luxury tax to a more restrictive measure such as a hard cap, but who 
still would likely oppose any policy that is contrary to their interests.168
Finally, whether a luxury tax, a hard cap, or some other option not ex-
plored here, it is clear that European football must take steps to improve 
competitive balance, and increase the unpredictability of results. Argua-
bly, professional football in Europe is played at a higher skill level than 
any other competition in the sport. It is unquestionable that Europe is the 
biggest market for the biggest game in the world. Thus, for the sake of 
the sport, something must be done to make European football matches 
matter again. 
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